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We consider the strategic choice between product innovation and lo-
gistic optimization in a novel urban framework where consumers are 
distributed across the city and have different incomes depending on 
their location in the town. Depending on the relative efficiency of the 
product innovation process and the logistic innovation process as 
well as on the degree of spatial symmetry between the firms, both 
symmetric and asymmetric business strategy equilibria may arise, as 
well as both unique and multiple business strategy equilibria. 
  
JEL codes: L13; R12; R41 










A frequent decision that firms face in their day-by-day business life 
concerns which type of innovation to engage on. On one hand, firms 
would like to improve the quality of their products, as a higher-
quality good can be sold at a higher price. The efforts made by a firm 
in order to improve the quality of the product are usually labelled as 
“product innovation”. Product innovation frequently absorbs a rele-
vant share of the R&D activities of the firms (Cohen and Klepper, 
1994). Moreover, product innovation is commonly considered within 
the business community as a fundamental instrument to increase 
market share and firms’ profits. On the other hand, firms would like 
to reduce their costs too, as this, all else being equal, directly trans-
lates into higher profits. Nowadays, one of the most relevant compo-
nents of firms’ expenditures is represented by transportation costs, 
that constitute on average one of the top five expenditures for firms,
1 
and are accounted for nearly 60% of the overall logistic costs of 
firms (Hesse and Rodrigue, 2004). A firm that works to minimize its 
own transportation costs is said to engage in “logistic optimization”. 
Needless to say, transportation costs and logistic optimization are 
                                                      
1 See for instance www.hitachiconsultin.org and http://www.tompkinsinc.com/.     6 
central issues when firms operating in a spatial environment are con-
sidered.  
Given that firms’ resources are limited, the firms have often to 
choose whether to engage in product innovation or logistic optimiza-
tion. Such decision has important implications in terms of how the 
firms compete in a spatial market. The aim of this paper is to investi-
gate the strategic interaction between the decision to engage in prod-
uct innovation and the decision to reduce transportation costs when 
two firms compete in a urban-type framework. While product inno-
vation has been widely investigated in its relation with process inno-
vation (i.e., the reduction of the production costs)
2, as far as we 
know, it has never been studied in its relation with logistic optimiza-
tion (i.e., the reduction of the transportation costs)
3. This represents 
the first main novelty of our contribution. In order to study the stra-
tegic interaction between product innovation and logistic optimiza-
tion, a standard game-theoretic approach is adopted. Two firms, 
which are located in two different points of the city (the locations are 
kept as general as possible), first simultaneously and non-
cooperatively decide their business strategy (product innovation or 
logistic optimization) and then simultaneously set the price. We want 
                                                      
2 See, among the others, the contributions by Lin and Saggi (2002), Rosenk-
ranz (2003) and Weiss (2003). 
3 Quite surprisingly, logistic optimization itself has received scarce attention 
by economists even if it is a core strategy for every firm. The only papers 
considering transportation costs reducing practices by competing firm we 
are aware of are Dos Santos Ferreira and Thisse (1996) and Hendel and 
Neiva de Figueiredo (1997).    7
to shed light on the relationship between the locational distribution of 
the firms across the city and their decision to invest in high quality 
products or to decrease the transportation costs. Similarly, we shall 
show how the degree of spatial symmetry between the two firms im-
pacts over the business strategy equilibrium arising in the game. 
The second and novel contribution of this article consists in the ur-
ban framework we adopt to investigate the choice between product 
innovation and logistic optimization. We develop an extension of the 
familiar Hotelling linear-city model that includes a double heteroge-
neity of residents. The first dimension of heterogeneity is standard in 
spatial models: consumers/residents live in different points of the 
city, as someone is located near to the city centre, while some others 
are located at the peripheries of the town. The second dimension of 
heterogeneity concerns the income of the residents, which is sup-
posed to vary across the city’s zones. This reflects a common feature 
of modern towns. The cost of the houses and of the rents varies 
across the different zones of the town. Allegedly, the income of peo-
ple living in prestigious zones is expected to be higher than the in-
come of those citizens living in the poorest areas of the town. In this 
sense, the model we propose here has both a horizontal component 
and a vertical component: it is horizontal as the residents are distrib-
uted along the space; it is vertical as the income is distributed along 
the residents. Moreover, the distribution of the income is related to 
the distribution of the residents across the urban space.     8 
We obtain the following results. When the efficiency of product in-
novation is low with respect to the efficiency of the logistic optimi-
zation process, multiple asymmetric business strategy equilibria 
arise: one firm chooses product innovation, while the rival chooses 
logistic optimization, and this may happen even if the firms are 
symmetrically localized in the city. When the efficiency of the prod-
uct innovation is moderate, only one asymmetric business strategy 
equilibrium arises, where the firm located at the periphery of the city 
chooses logistic optimization, while the firm located in the central 
zone chooses product innovation. Instead, when the efficiency of the 
product innovation is sufficiently high, as expected, both firms 
choose product innovation. An implication of these results is that the 
peripheral firm is more prompt than the central firm to choose logis-
tic optimization instead than product innovation. Moreover, we study 
the impact of the degree of spatial asymmetry between the firms on 
the business strategy equilibrium arising in the market. The main re-
sult is the following: when the degree of spatial asymmetry between 
the firms is low, both firms are more likely to choose product inno-
vation, while when the degree of spatial asymmetry is high asymmet-
ric business strategy equilibria are more likely to arise.  
Further, we analyse the case of a monopolistic firm endowed with 
two plants localized in the city and facing the dilemma about where 
to engage on product innovation and where to engage in logistic op-
timization. We find that when the efficiency of the product innova-   9
tion is sufficiently low, the profits maximizing configuration is char-
acterized by the central plant engaging in product innovation and the 
peripheral plant engaging in logistic optimization.  
Finally, we discuss the welfare implications of the different business 
strategy configurations. We show that the business strategy configu-
ration that maximizes welfare is represented by the symmetric con-
figuration where both firms sell the high-quality good, provided that 
the efficiency of the product innovation is high with respect to the 
efficiency of the logistic optimization process. Instead, if the effi-
ciency of the product innovation is low with respect to the efficiency 
of the logistic optimization process, the optimal configuration con-
sists in the central firm engaging in product innovation, while the pe-
ripheral firm should save on the transportation costs. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we intro-
duce the model. In Section 3 we study the second-stage equilibrium 
when both firms choose the same business strategy, while in Section 
4 we study the second-stage equilibrium when the firms choose dif-
ferent business strategies. In Section 5, we characterize the sub-game 
Nash perfect equilibrium. In Section 6 we modify the model to con-
sider the case of a multi-plant monopolist. Section 7 considers the 
welfare implications. Section 8 concludes. All the proofs are rele-
gated in the Appendix. 
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2. The model 
 
In this section we develop an urban-type framework, where residents 
are differentiated both in terms of their location in the city and in 
terms of their income. We consider a linear town, where residents are 
uniformly distributed. Denote by  ] 1   , 0 [ ∈ x  the location of each resi-
dent. In the city, two firms (firm A and firm B) are active. Fixed and 
marginal costs of both firms are constant and normalized to zero. The 
location of firm A in the city is indicated by  d s− , while the loca-
tion of firm B is indicated by  d s + , where  ] 2 1   , 0 ( ∈ s  and 
]   , 0 ( s d ∈ . Therefore, the firms’ locations in the town are weakly 
asymmetrically distorted to the left. Parameter s measures the degree 
of symmetry between firms: for given d, the higher is s, the higher is 
symmetry: firms are symmetrically localized in the town when 
2 1 = s . Parameter d instead measures (half of) the distance between 
the firms: for given s, the higher is d, the more the firms are distant 
in the city. Therefore, when  2 1 = s  and  0 = d  the two firms are lo-
cated in the city centre, when  0 = = d s  both firms are located at the 
left periphery of the city, and so on. In the rest of the article, we shall 
often refer to firm A (resp. B) as the “peripheral” (resp. “central”) 
firm. Firms sustain linear transportation costs to ship the good from 
the plant to the residents. To ship one unit of the product from plant 
d s−  (resp.  d s + ) to resident x, firm A (resp. B) pays a transport    11
cost equal to:  x d s t − −  (resp.  x d s t − + ), where t is the strictly 
positive unit transport cost. Firms may decide to engage in logistic 
optimization (L), with to purpose to reduce the transportation costs. 
Examples of logistic optimization practices include: adopting cost-
saving carriers, investing in faster transportation technologies, opti-
mizing the shipment plan… We assume that when a firm engages in 
L, its transportation costs drop to zero.
4 In this sense, parameter t 
measures also the efficiency of the logistic optimization process: the 
higher is t, the stronger is the reduction of the transportation costs 
due to the logistic optimization process. 
As standard in shipping models, firms are able to discriminate among 
residents (Hamilton et al., 1989). Arbitrage among residents is as-
sumed to prohibitively costly, so it is excluded. Let  ) (x pJ  denote 
the price schedule charged by firm  B A J , = . A price schedule re-
fers to a positive valued function  (.) J p , with  B A J , = , defined on 
] 1   , 0 [  that specifies the price  ) (x pJ  at which firm J is willing to 
sell one unit to resident x. In the rest of the article the argument of 
the price schedules shall be omitted in order to save on notation. 
                                                      
4 The case where the transportation costs diminish still being positive can be 
analysed within the same framework. This case would correspond to the 
more realistic situation where there are factors that are exogenous to the 
firms, like public expenditure in infrastructure or oil prices. However, as-
suming that in the case of logistic optimization the transportation costs be-
come zero just simplifies the calculations without affecting qualitatively the 
results, and therefore this assumption has been maintained throughout the 
article.     12
Each resident buys no more than one unit of the good. The utility 
function of resident x when he buys from firm A (resp. B) is given 
by:  ) ( ) ( x p x f I v A A − + γ  (resp.  ) ( ) ( x p x f I v B B − + γ ). Parameter v 
is assumed to be sufficiently high, so that in equilibrium all residents 
are served.  J I  takes value 1 if firm  B A J , =  engages in product in-
novation (P), while takes value 0 if firm  B A J , =  does not engage 
in product innovation. Therefore, product innovation is modelled 
here as an improvement of the existing product, such that, all else be-
ing equal, the willingness to pay of the residents for the good in-
creases when a firm engages in P. Parameter γ  is a measure of the 
product innovation efficiency: all else being equal, the higher is γ , 
the higher is the increase of the willingness to pay of the residents 
due to product innovation. We assume the following functional form 












x f . Function  (.) f  al-
lows to model different marginal utilities of quality. In particular, the 
residents located at the periphery of the city ( 0 = x  and  1 = x ) re-
ceive zero utility from quality, while the marginal utility of quality is 
highest for the resident located in the town centre ( 2 1 = x ). As 
shown by Tirole (1988), high-income consumers have a higher mar-
ginal utility from quality than low-income consumers. Therefore, the 
difference of the marginal utility from quality across residents de-
scribed by  (.) f  reflects the difference of income across the residents    13
in the city: the inverse U-shape functional form of  (.) f  adopted here 
describes a situation where high-income residents reside in the city 
centre while low-income residents live in the peripheral areas.
5 We 
assume that R&D costs of improving the quality of the product (i.e. 
engaging in product innovation) and the R&D costs of reducing the 
transportation costs (i.e. engaging in logistic optimization) are fixed 
and equal.
6 As fixed and equal costs do not play any role in the stra-
tegic choice between the two business strategies (see later), they 
shall be disregarded throughout the article. 
The timing of the game is the following. In stage 1 the two firms 
choose simultaneously whether to engage in P or L,
7 while in stage 2 
                                                      
5 This type of vertical differentiation within a horizontal differentiation set-
up has been proposed for example by Brekke et al. (2010). Note that in that 
case, the consumers were not heterogeneous with respect to their willing-
ness-to-pay for quality, as in other models of “pure” vertical differentiation 
(see for example, Motta, 1993). In contrast, our model is more complete, as 
we allow also for vertical differentiation in the sense that the residents ob-
tain different marginal utility from quality, while maintaining the heteroge-
neity with respect to the horizontal dimension (the “space”). In Section 8 we 
shall discuss the implications of different functional forms of  ) (x f , that is, 
different income distributions across the city. 
6 Even if not realistic, this assumption allows focusing on the strategic 
choice between the two managerial decisions (logistic optimization vs prod-
uct innovation) without caring about the relative costs of the two strategies. 
In fact, the higher is the cost of product innovation, the more likely is logis-
tic optimization in equilibrium, and vice-verse. To avoid taking into account 
such trivial effects, we simply assume that both strategies have the same 
implementation costs. 
7 We do not allow for the possibility to engage simultaneously in both types 
of business strategies. This can be rationalized by assuming that the fixed 
costs are too high to allow for two profitable innovations (logistic and prod-   14
the two firms choose simultaneously the price schedule. The sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium concept is used in solving the game. 
As usual, we shall proceed by backward induction. 
Finally, we introduce the following assumption on the parameters of 
the model to maintain the analysis analytically tractable. Let us define 
t γ ϑ ≡ . Parameter ϑ  measures the efficiency of product innovation 
with respect to the efficiency of the logistic optimization process. We 
assume that product innovation is neither too efficient nor too ineffi-
cient with respect to the efficiency of the logistic optimization process. 
In particular, we assume that:  ] 1   ), ( 2 1 [ d s− − ∈ ϑ . That is, we con-
sider a moderately efficient product innovation process with respect to 
the logistic optimization process. This allows the logistic-optimizing 
firm to have a positive demand in equilibrium when the rival engages 
in product innovation (upper bound), and guarantees that the market 
area of at least one firm is continuous (lower bound).
8 
 
                                                                                                                
uct), but are sufficiently low to allow for one profitable innovation in equi-
librium. Also, it can be easily shown that the decision not to innovate is al-
ways dominated by the decision to engage in one of the two strategies, so it 
can be excluded. 
8 See later in Section 4 and in the Appendix for more details.    15
3. Symmetric strategies  
 
In this section, we define the equilibrium price and profits in the sec-
ond stage of the game when the two firms have chosen the same 
business strategy in the first stage of the game.  
Case  ) , ( P P . We consider the case where both firms have chosen P 
in stage 1 of the game. The equilibrium prices are described in the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. In the case  ) , ( P P , the equilibrium prices are: 
 




A − + − − = = ; max * *                                (1)                      
 
Proof. See the Appendix.                                                                    ■                      
 
The equilibrium profits are therefore:  
 
) 2 ( ) * ( *




A − = − − − = Π ∫                              (2)                      
                                       
) 2 2 ( ) * ( *
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B − − = − + − = Π ∫                        (3)                      
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Case  ) , ( L L . We consider now the case where both firms have cho-
sen logistic optimization in stage 1 of the game. If both firms choose 
to engage in logistic optimization, the transportation costs of both 
firms fall to zero. It follows that no firm has a locational advantage 
over the other firm, whatever is the location of the residents. It fol-
lows that standard Bertrand competition drives the equilibrium price 
at any location to zero. As a consequence, the equilibrium profits of 






4. Asymmetric strategies  
 
In this section, we define the equilibrium price and profits in the sec-
ond stage of the game, when the two firms have chosen different 
business strategies in the first stage of the game.  
 
Case  ) , ( P L . We first consider the case where the peripheral firm 
(firm A) has chosen L, while the central firm (firm B) has chosen P in 
the first stage of the game. The following proposition defines the 
equilibrium price schedules: 
 
Proposition 2. In the case  ) , ( P L , the equilibrium prices are: 
    17
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                               (5)                      
 
Proof. See the Appendix.                                                                    ■                      
The following proposition determines the urban area served by each 
firm in equilibrium in case  ) , ( P L : 
 
Proposition 3. Under  ) , ( P L , firm A serves the residents located at 
1 ˆ x x ≤  and  2 ˆ x x ≥ , while firm B serves the residents located at 
















γ ) ( ˆ2 . 
 
Proof. See the Appendix.                                                                    ■  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the market areas of the two firms in equilibrium: 
firm A serves the residents located at the left of  1 ˆ x  and at the right of 
2 ˆ x , while firm B serves the residents located between  1 ˆ x  and  2 ˆ x .  











= − + =
γ
γ 1 ˆ 1 ˆ 2 1 , while 








1 2 ˆ ˆ . Note that the de-
mand of the logistic-optimizing firm in equilibrium is positive. Also, 
both  1 ˆ x  and  2 ˆ x  are interior solutions, as  0 ˆ
2
1 ˆ 1 1 2 ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ x x . Such 
equilibrium distribution of the residents between the two firms is due 
to the fact that when firm A engages in logistic optimization, it is 
equally efficient in serving all residents, whatever is their location in 
the city. Therefore, firm A is able to serve residents both at the left 
and at the right of firm B, but not in the proximity of firm B’s loca-
tion, as here firm B’s transportation costs are low too (even if posi-
tive). It follows that the equilibrium profits of the two firms are: 
 
) ( 2
)] 2 1 ( 2 2 2 2 1 [
* * *






s d s s d t








− − + − +
= + = Π ∫ ∫ γ
(6)     
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) ( 4
] ) 2 2 1 ( [














= − + − = Π ∫ γ
ϑ ϑ
        (7)                      
 
Case  ) , ( L P . We consider now the case where the peripheral firm 
(firm A) has chosen product innovation, while the central firm (firm 
B) has chosen logistic optimization in the first stage of the game. The 
following proposition defines the equilibrium price schedules: 
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x f x d s t if



















   
) (
) (
x f x d s t if





                  (9)                     
 
Proof. The proof proceeds as the proof of Proposition 2, therefore it 
has been omitted.                                                                                ■ 
 
The following proposition determines the urban area served by each 
firm in equilibrium in case  ) , ( L P : 
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Proposition 5. Under  ) , ( L P , firm B serves the residents located at 
1
~ x x ≤  and  2
~ x x ≥ , while firm A serves the residents located at 

















ϑ ) ( ~
2 . 
 
Proof. See the Appendix.                                                                    ■                      
Figure 2 illustrates the market areas of the two firms in equilibrium: 
firm B serves the residents located at the left of  1
~ x  and at the right of 
2
~ x , while firm A serves the residents located between  1
~ x  and  2
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2 1 . Note that the de-
mand of the logistic-optimizing firm is positive. Moreover, both  1
~ x     21
and  2
~ x  are interior solutions, as  0 ~
2
1 ~ 1 1 2 ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ x x . Therefore, the 
equilibrium profits of the two firms are: 
 
) ( 4
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(11) 
 
5. The sub-game perfect equilibrium 
 
We consider now the first stage of the game, where the firms have to 
choose simultaneously whether to engage in logistic optimization or 
product innovation. The following pay-off table (Table 1) illustrates 
the four possible cases. 
 
The following proposition defines the business strategy equilibrium, 
that is, the business strategy chosen by each firm in the first stage of 
the game: 
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Proposition 6.  Consider the first stage of the game. Define 
) 2 ( 2
2 2 4 2 1
2 2
1 d s d
s s d d
−
+ − + −
≡ ϑ  and 
) 2 2 ( 2
2 2 4 2 1
2 2
2 s d d
s s d d
− −
+ − + −
≡ ϑ , 
where  2 1 ϑ ϑ ≥ . When  2 ϑ ϑ ≤ , there are two business strategy equi-
libria,  ) , ( L P  and  ) , ( P L ; when  ] , [ 1 2 ϑ ϑ ϑ∈ , there is a unique 
business strategy equilibrium,  ) , ( P L ; when  1 ϑ ϑ ≥ , there is a 
unique business strategy equilibrium,  ) , ( P P .  
 
Proof. See the Appendix.                                                                    ■  
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Proposition 6 states that when the efficiency of the product innova-
tion is low with respect to the efficiency of the logistic optimization 
process ( 2 ϑ ϑ ≤ ), we have multiple equilibria. Interestingly, we do 
not have symmetric business strategy equilibria as one may expect: 
instead, one firm chooses product innovation, while the rival chooses 
logistic optimization. Therefore, two asymmetric innovation equilib-
ria arise. In particular, note that this happens even if the two firms 
are symmetrically localized in the city, provided that product innova-
tion is not too efficient. When the efficiency of the product innova-
tion is moderate ( 1 2 ϑ ϑ ϑ ≤ ≤ ), only one asymmetric business strat-
egy equilibrium arises: the peripheral firm (firm A) chooses logistic 
optimization, while the central firm (firm B) chooses product innova-
tion. Finally, when the efficiency of the product innovation is high 
( 1 ϑ ϑ ≥ ), only one symmetric innovation equilibrium arises, where 
both firms choose product innovation.  
The intuition is the following. First, suppose that one firm chooses L. 
The dominant strategy for the rival consists in choosing P. This is 
due to the fact that if both firms engage in L, spatial differentiation 
disappears (transportation costs fall to zero, so the firms compete vis-
à-vis in all points of the city). As a consequence, Bertrand competi-
tion determines zero prices everywhere. Suppose now that one firm 
chooses P. Which is the best-reply of the rival? If the rival chooses 
P, the same conditions of a no-innovation equilibrium are obtained, 
as both firms improve the quality of their product by the same    24
amount. Instead, if the rival chooses L, a different situation arises. In 
order to evaluate the opportunity for an asymmetric business choice 
by a firm when the other chooses P, consider the equilibrium prices 
as defined in Proposition 2 and Proposition 4. Clearly, the higher is 
the efficiency of product innovation with respect to the efficiency of 
logistic optimization (that is, the higher is ϑ ), the lower is the price 
that the firm choosing L has to set in order to compensate for the 
quality difference between the two products. Therefore, all else being 
equal, the higher is ϑ , the lower is the mark-up that the firm choos-
ing L obtains at each location in the city. We call this effect as price 
effect: the price effect suggests that one firm should replicate the 
business strategy of the other firm when it chooses P. In particular, 
the higher is ϑ , the stronger is the price effect. However, the price 
effect is not the only effect at work. Consider the market area of the 
firm choosing L. If firm B chooses P and firm A chooses L, the mar-
ket area of firm A goes from 0 to  1 ˆ x  and from  2 ˆ x  to 1.
9 Instead, if 
firm A chooses P as the rival, its market area goes from 0 to s. Figure 
3 illustrates the market area of firm A in case  ) , ( P L  and in case 




                                                      
9 The case where firm A chooses P and firm B chooses L is similar, and 





In particular, the market area of firm A under asymmetric business 
strategies is always higher than under symmetric business strate-
gies.
10 This is not a surprise. When firm A chooses L, it can serve 
                                                      




− = − +
γ
γ
1 ˆ 1 ˆ 2 1 , which is always larger than s, which is the market 
area of firm A in case  ) , ( P P . To prove this, we have to show that    26
each location of the city with lower transportation costs, and this al-
lows firm A to serve also those locations at the right of firm B. We 
call this effect the demand effect: the demand effect suggests that one 
firm should not replicate the business strategy of the other firm when 
the rival chooses P. Note that the higher is ϑ , the weaker is the de-
mand effect: when product innovation is particularly efficient, firm A 
cannot obtain a large market share even if it does not sustain trans-
portation costs. Therefore, we observe two contrasting effects when a 
firm has to choose whether to engage in product innovation or in lo-
gistic innovation given that the rival is engaging in product innova-
tion. If the product innovation efficiency is high, the price effect is 
strong and the demand effect is weak. Therefore, the firm replicates 
the business strategy of the rival. On the other hand, if the product 
innovation efficiency is low, the price effect is weak and the demand 
effect is strong. Therefore, the firm chooses to engage in logistic op-
timization when the rival chooses product innovation. 
A direct implication of Proposition 6 is that the peripheral firm is 
more prompt than the central firm to choose logistic optimization 
when the rival chooses product innovation. In fact, we observe that 















1 . As the left-hand-side of the last inequality de-
creases with s, we may consider only 
2
1
= s . Substituting into the inequal-










> 1 , which is true by assumption.    27
2 1 ϑ ϑ ≥ , which implies that there is a parameter space where firm A 
chooses L when firm B chooses P, while firm B chooses P when firm 
A chooses P. The higher propensity of the peripheral firm to differen-
tiate its business strategy from the rival follows from the discussion 
above. Firm A is disadvantaged with respect to firm B by its periph-
eral location in the city. Therefore, it benefits more than firm B by 
the reduction of the transportation costs due to the logistic optimiza-
tion, which allows it to serve also distant residents. In other words, 
the demand effect is stronger for firm A than for firm B.  
 
We investigate now the effects of spatial symmetry/asymmetry be-
tween firms on the equilibrium arising in the market. Therefore, we 
consider the impact of higher s (higher spatial symmetry in the city 
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We have that  0 1 ≤ ∂ ∂ s ϑ   d s   , ∀ , while  0   ) ( 2 ≥ ≤ ∂ ∂ s ϑ  if and only 
if  2 ) 9 6 2 2 (   ) (
2 d d d s + − − − ≥ ≤ . Moreover, we observe that:    28
) 2 1 ( ) 2 1 ( 2 1 = = = s s ϑ ϑ . Figure 4 illustrates the shape of  1 ϑ  and 
2 ϑ  as a function of s. In Figure 4, the downward-sloping curves rep-
resent  1 ϑ  and  2 ϑ . The horizontal straight line and the downward-
sloping straight line limit the admissible values of ϑ  (i.e. 
] 1   ), ( 2 1 [ d s− − ∈ ϑ ). Figure 4 shows that, depending on the level of 
spatial symmetry, the conditions on ϑ  for the emerging of symmet-
ric or asymmetric business strategy equilibria may vary. When the 
firms are strongly asymmetric, only asymmetric business strategy 
equilibria may arise. In particular, if product innovation is efficient 
enough (that is,  2 ϑ ϑ ≥ ), there is a unique asymmetric equilibrium, 
where the peripheral firm chooses logistic optimization, while the 
central firm chooses the product innovation. Instead, if ϑ  is suffi-
ciently low (that is,  2 ϑ ϑ ≤ ), multiple asymmetric business strategy 
equilibria are possible. When the firms are sufficiently symmetric in 
the city, even a symmetric business strategy equilibrium where both 
firms choose product innovation may arise, provided that product in-
novation is efficient enough with respect to logistic optimization 
(that is,  1 ϑ ϑ ≥ ). However, multiple asymmetric business strategy 
equilibria or a unique asymmetric business strategy equilibrium are 
still possible (when  1 ϑ ϑ ≤ ). Importantly, note that, as  1 ϑ  decreases 
with s and  2 ϑ  increases with s when s is sufficiently high, the pa-
rameter space supporting the unique asymmetric equilibrium  ) , ( P L     29
becomes narrower for higher levels of symmetry, and at the limit col-
lapses to zero when firms are perfectly symmetric. On the other 
hand, the parameter space supporting the symmetric equilibrium 
) , ( P P  becomes larger when the firms are more symmetrically local-





We can summarize the impact of firms’ symmetry as follows:  
 
Result 1. The symmetric business strategy equilibrium where both 
firms choose product innovation is more likely when the degree of 
spatial symmetry between the firms is high, while asymmetric busi-
ness strategy equilibria are more likely to arise when the degree of 
spatial symmetry between the firms is low. Multiple equilibria may    30
happen when firms are strongly symmetric or strongly asymmetric in 
the city.  
 
The intuition behind the impact of the degree of symmetry over the 
critical values of ϑ  is the following. Consider  1 ϑ : if  1 ϑ ϑ ≥ , firm A 
chooses P when firm B chooses P; if  1 ϑ ϑ ≤ , firm A chooses L when 
firm B chooses P. As we already pointed out, the choice between 
product innovation and logistic optimization by firm A depends on 
the relative strength of the price effect and the demand effect. We 
also noted that the demand effect is weaker the more firm A is lo-
cated near to the city centre. It follows that the higher is s the lower 
is the demand effect. Therefore, the higher is s, the larger is the pa-
rameter space supporting  ) , ( P P . Consider now  2 ϑ : if  2 ϑ ϑ ≥ , firm 
B chooses P when firm A chooses P; if  2 ϑ ϑ ≤ , firm B chooses L 
when firm A chooses P. As for firm A, the demand effect is weaker 
the more firm B is located near to the city centre. It follows that that 
the higher is s the stronger is the demand effect. Hence, the higher is 
s, the more is likely that firm B differentiates the business strategy 
from firm A when the latter chooses product innovation.
11 
                                                      
11 One should note that also a “second-order” effect emerges when s in-
creases, and this effect is responsible for the decreasing pattern of  2 ϑ  for 
low levels of s. To see this, consider the equilibrium prices of firm B 
(Proposition 2) and the equilibrium market areas (Proposition 3). When s 
increases, the identity of the residents served in equilibrium by firm B 




The analysis developed in this section has clear implications for the 
locational distribution of firms across the city. For example, Proposi-
tion 6 implies that, all else being equal, the peripheral firm benefits 
more than the central firm from logistic optimization, while the op-
                                                                                                                
market area at the left of firm A enlarges: that is, residents located at the 
right of firm A are substituted by residents located at the left of firm A. 
Therefore, as the equilibrium prices of firm B are higher when the residents 
are more distant from firm A, it turns out that, for low levels of s, more prof-
itable residents are substituted by less profitable residents. It follows that the 
equilibrium profits of firm B when it chooses P decreases with the degree of 
spatial symmetry.    32
posite holds with regard to product innovation. In other words, one 
should expect to observe high-quality firms located in the centre of 
the city, while low-quality (but cheaper) firms located in the periph-
eral zones. This is commonly observed in those cities where the 
high-income residents live in the city centre. Let us consider for ex-
ample the distribution across periphery and centre of furniture shops 
in the city of Milan. In Figure 5 we insert the locations of out-
lets/showroom of the cheapest furniture (kitchen) firms operating in 
Italy,
12 and the most expensive furniture firms.
13 The location of low-
quality and low-price furniture outlets is indicated with the red arrow 
in the map, while the location of high-quality and high-price outlets 
is indicated with the blue arrow. We observe that the firms locating 
at the peripheral areas of Milan are those firms committed to charg-
ing consumers with low prices and offer advantageous conditions for 
furniture transportation (cheap low-quality firms). On the other hand, 
the firms having their outlets located at the centre of Milan are those 
firms which offer high-quality furniture at higher prices (expensive 
high-quality firms).
14 
                                                      
12 Ikea, with three outlets in the Milan area, Mondo Convenienza, with two 
outlets, and Record and Classika, with one outlet each. 
13 Boffi, Gaggenau, Strato, Ernesto Meda, Binova and Bulthaup with one 
outlet each, and Scavolini with two outlets. 
14 It may be noted that some of the firms indicated in the example (e.g. Ikea) 
offer a transport service in change of a fixed payment within a well-defined 
geographical area, which configures the model as a mixture of shipping and 
shopping models, while other firms (e.g. Scavolini) sustain entirely the 
transportation costs (pure shipping model).     33
6. Multi-plant monopolist 
 
In this section, the model introduced in Section 2 is slightly modified 
to consider the case of a monopolistic firm endowed with two plants 
that has to decide where to develop product innovation and where to 
engage in logistic optimization.
15 We proceed by considering case by 
case. 
 
Case  ) , ( L L . Suppose that the two plants engage in logistic optimi-
zation. It is immediate to see that the optimal price at each location is 
the price that extracts the whole consumer surplus, which is given by 
v. As the transportation costs are zero for both plants, from the point 
of view of the maximization of the joint profits each location can be 
served indifferently by one of the two plants. It follows that the total 
profits are given by: 
                                                      
15 Note that the monopolist multi-plant firm can engage in both business 
strategies, while each duopolistic firm can engage in only one strategy 
(footnote 7). The reason is that even if the fixed costs duplicate when the 
monopolist engages in two different strategies, its profits are higher too, and 
we assume they are sufficient to cover the fixed costs in equilibrium. A 
more subtle question instead is the following: if one plant invests in P and 
improves the quality of the product, why can’t it transfer its knowledge to 
the other plant (the same for the investment in L)? We rationalize this as-
sumption by noticing that knowledge is often plant-based and it is costly to 
transfer it to other plants. Such costs may consists in moving qualified 
workers and/or machines that allow the product or the logistic innovation. 
We assume that the costs of sharing knowledge and innovation are suffi-
ciently high to prevent both plants of the multi-plant monopolist to engage 
in both business strategies.      34
 
v vdx
LL = = Π ∫
1
0
                                                                        (14) 
 
Case  ) , ( P P . We consider now the case where both plants are de-
voted to product innovation. The optimal price at each location is 
again the price that extracts the whole consumer surplus. In this case 
the price is higher, as residents are prompt to pay a higher price in 
order to buy the high-quality product. In particular, the price is now: 
) (x f v γ + . Moreover, the two plants sustain positive transportation 
costs. Therefore, the total profits are maximized when every location 
is served by the nearer plant. It follows that the expression of the to-
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if  2 1 ≤ +d s . In both cases, the total profits are: 
 
4
) 2 2 4 2 1 ( 2 4
2 2 s s d d t v PP + − + − − +
= Π
γ
                               (15) 
     
Case  ) , ( P L . We consider now the case where the peripheral plant is 
devoted to logistic optimization, while the central plant is devoted to 
product innovation. In this case, the optimal price set by plant A is v, 
while the optimal price set by plant B is  ) (x f v γ + . As plant B sus-
tains the transportation costs, the mark-up obtained at each location 
if it is served by the product innovating plant is: 
x d s t x f v − + − + ) ( γ . At the opposite, the mark-up obtained at 
each location if it is served by plant A is simply v, as plant A does not 
sustain any transportation cost. By comparing the two mark-ups, we 
get that, from the point of view of the total profits, plant A should 
serve the residents located at the left of  1 ˆ x  and at the right of  2 ˆ x , 
while plant B should serve the residents located between  1 ˆ x  and  2 ˆ x ,    36
where  1 ˆ x  and  2 ˆ x  have been defined in Section 4. It follows that the 
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if  2 1 ≤ +d s . In both cases, the total profits are: 
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Case  ) , ( L P . Finally, we consider the case where the peripheral 
plant engages in product innovation, while the central plant engages 
in logistic optimization. In this case, the optimal price set by firm A 
is  ) (x f v γ + , while the optimal price set by firm B is v. Following 
the same reasoning introduced above, it is immediate to note that, in 
order to maximize the joint profits, plant B should serve the residents 
located at the left of  1
~ x  and at the right of  2
~ x , while plant A should 
serve the residents located between  1
~ x  and  2
~ x , where  1
~ x  and  2
~ x  
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We consider now which type of business strategy configuration 
should be chosen in order to maximize the profits of the multi-plant 
firm. We state the following proposition: 
                                                      
16 Note that only the case  2 1 ≤ −d s  is possible under  ) , ( L P .    38
Proposition 7.  If  1 ϑ ϑ ≤ , the multi-plant firm chooses  ) , ( P L ; if 
1 ϑ ϑ ≥ , the multi-plant firm chooses  ) , ( P P .  
 
Proof. See the Appendix.                                                                    ■  
 
Therefore, Proposition 7 shows that, depending on parameter ϑ , two 
profits maximizing configuration may arise: if ϑ  is sufficiently high, 
both plants should engage in product innovation, while if ϑ  is suffi-
ciently low, the central plant should engage in product innovation, 
while the peripheral plant should engage in logistic optimization. By 
comparing this result with the competitive business strategy equilib-
rium (Section 5), it is immediate to note that a situation where the 
central firm engages in logistic optimization while the peripheral 
firm engages in product innovation is never expected to arise. The 
intuition is the following. When there is a multi-plant firm, two in-
centives are at work. On one hand, both plants would like to set a 
high price. Product innovation, by developing a high-quality product, 
allows firms to set a higher price and extract more consumer surplus. 
On the other hand, the plants would like also to save on transporta-
tion costs. Logistic optimization, by reducing the cost of shipping the 
good across the city, decreases the transportation costs. When the in-
crease of quality is sufficiently high relatively to the reduction of the 
transportation costs ( 1 ϑ ϑ ≥ ) the first effect dominates, and both 
plants develop a high-quality good in order to extract more consumer    39
surplus, while when the increase of quality is low ( 1 ϑ ϑ ≤ ) the sec-
ond effect dominates, and only the central plant develops a high-
quality good. Clearly, a situation where only the peripheral plant de-
velops a high-quality good is never expected to arise. In fact, it 
would imply that only the peripheral residents are served with a high 
quality product. But this is certainly not profit-maximizing, since the 
residents with the highest willingness to pay for quality are the rich-
est residents, which are located at the city centre. Therefore, in the 
case where only one plant engages in product innovation, it must be 
the central plant, as the central residents are the most profitable con-
sumers. Note that in the case of competition between firms, also a 
situation where only the peripheral firm develops a high-quality 
product may arise in equilibrium (when  2 ϑ ϑ ≤ , see Proposition 6). 
This is due to the fact that, when the central firm engages in logistic 
optimization, it is optimal for the peripheral firm to engage in prod-
uct innovation, and, when the peripheral firm engages in product in-
novation, it is optimal for the central firm to engage in logistic opti-
mization (see the discussion in Section 5). However, as shown in 
Proposition 7, this situation does not maximize the joint profits and 
represents a prisoner dilemma, as when  2 ϑ ϑ ≤  (and then also when 
1 ϑ ϑ ≤ ) the joint-profits maximizing configuration is  ) , ( P L . 
On the other hand, it is worth to note that the two configurations 
) , ( P L  and  ) , ( P P  occur under the same circumstances both when    40
the two firms compete and when the two firms act as one (in fact, the 
threshold of parameter ϑ  is  1 ϑ  in both cases). In this sense, the re-
sult that when product innovation is not extremely efficient the pe-
ripheral firm engages in logistic optimization while the central firm 
engages in product innovation is robust to the case where both plants 




In this section we discuss the implications of the different business 
strategy configurations on welfare. We consider the competitive set-
up developed in Section 3, 4 and 5. First, we calculate the consumer 
surplus under each configuration. Then, we shall evaluate which 
business strategy configuration maximizes the consumer surplus and 
welfare.  
We consider first the case where both firms engage in logistic opti-
mization,  ) , ( L L . As in equilibrium both firms set a price equal to 






0                                                                          (18) 
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In the case of asymmetric business strategy configurations, the equi-
librium prices are described in Proposition 2 and 4. First, we con-
sider the case where only the central firm engages in product innova-
tion,  ) , ( P L . The total consumer surplus is the following: 
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Two things are worth to note. First, consider the market area served 
by the product-innovating firm, that is, the central urban area be-
tween  1 ˆ x  and  2 ˆ x . The residents located in this area buy a higher 
quality product. However, they do not enjoy any additional utility 
from consuming the higher quality product. In fact, the higher sur-
plus due to the fact that the product sold by firm B has an higher 
quality than the product sold by firm A is completed offset by the 
fact that the price set by firm B,  ) (x f γ , has increased. This is due to 
the fact that, when the transportation costs of firm B are lower than 
the additional willingness to pay stemming from higher quality, the 
product-innovating firm can serve the residents by applying a price 
which is the difference between the willingness to pay for an high-
quality product and a low-quality product: that is,  ) (x f γ . Second, 
consider the market areas served by the logistic-optimizing firm, that    42
is, the peripheral urban areas from 0 to  1 ˆ x  and from  2 ˆ x  to 1. The 
consumer surplus of a resident located at the left periphery of the city 
is given by:  x x d s t v γ + − + − ) ( . It is immediate to see that it con-
tinuously increases with x, and that when  1 ˆ x x =  it is equal to v. 
Similarly, the consumer surplus of a resident located at the right pe-
riphery of the city is given by:  ) 1 ( ) ( x d s x t v − + − − − γ . The con-
sumer surplus decreases continuously with x, and is equal to v when 
2 ˆ x x = . At the endpoints of the city,  0 = x  and  1 = x , the consumer 
surplus is equal to:  ) ( d s t v + −  and  ) 1 ( d s t v − − −  respectively. 
Figure 6 describes the consumer surplus as a function of the location 
in the city in the case  ) , ( P L . 
 
Now, we consider the case where only the peripheral firm engages in 
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Even in case  ) , ( L P , the residents which are served by the product-
innovating firm (which now is firm A) receives a utility which is 
equal to v, independently on their location in the city. On the other 
hand, the utility of the residents served by the logistic-optimizing 
firm (firm B) increases with x for the residents located between 0 and    44
1
~ x , and decreases with x for the residents located between  2
~ x  and 1. 
Figure 7 represents the consumers’ surplus as a function of x in the 
case  ) , ( L P . 
We are now in the position to compare the consumer surplus under 
the different business strategy configurations. First, we can compare 
LP CS  with 
PL CS . Note that  1 1 ˆ ~ x x ≤  and  2 2 ˆ ~ x x ≤ . In other words, 
Figure 7 is simply Figure 6 shifted to the left. It follows that the con-
sumer surplus in case  ) , ( P L  is higher than the consumer surplus in 
case  ) , ( L P , or 
PL LP CS CS ≥ . The reason is immediate. The sur-
plus of the residents served by the product-innovating firm is the 
same in both cases. Instead, the surplus of the residents served by the 
logistic-optimizing firm is different. In fact, in case  ) , ( L P , the mar-
ket area served by the logistic-optimizing firm is more distorted to 
the right with respect to the market area in case  ) , ( P L . As the equi-
librium price set by the logistic-optimizing firm increases with the 
distance between the resident and the product-innovating firm, it fol-
lows that the equilibrium prices at the right periphery of the city are 
higher when the logistic-optimizing firm is firm B. Clearly, the oppo-
site holds at the left periphery of the city. However, as the model is 
spatially distorted to the left, the reduction of the consumer surplus at 
the right periphery dominates over the increase of the consumer sur-
plus at the left periphery. It follows that the consumer surplus is 
higher in case  ) , ( P L  than in case  ) , ( L P . Consider now the con-   45
sumer surplus in case  ) , ( L L . As the surplus consumer of each resi-
dent is equal to v, it follows that the total consumer surplus is higher 
under  ) , ( L L  than under  ) , ( P L . The reason is the following. Con-
sider the residents located at the peripheries of the city. The equilib-
rium price is higher under  ) , ( P L  than under  ) , ( L L . In fact, when 
both firms engage in logistic optimization, Bertrand competition 
drives the prices to zero everywhere. Instead, when firm B sustains 
positive transportation costs, firm A is able to obtain positive profits 
over the peripheral residents. Therefore, the equilibrium surplus of 
the peripheral residents is higher under  ) , ( L L  than under  ) , ( P L , 
while the equilibrium surplus of the central residents is v under both 
cases. 
We can sum up in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 8. The consumer surplus in case  ) , ( L L  is higher than 
the consumer surplus in case  ) , ( P L , which in turn is higher than 
the consumer surplus in case  ) , ( L P . 
 
It remains to consider the case where both firms engages in product 
innovation,  ) , ( P P . The equilibrium prices are indicated in Proposi-
tion 1. Therefore, the total consumer surplus is given by: 
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In this case, the surplus of the residents buying from firm A (i.e. the 
residents located at  s x ≤ ) increases with x, as the marginal utility 
from quality is higher for more central residents, and the equilibrium 
price is lower due to fiercer competition between the firms for cen-
tral residents. Symmetrically, the surplus of the residents buying 
from firm B (i.e. the residents located at  s x ≥ ) decreases with x, as 
the marginal utility from quality is lower for more peripheral resi-
dents, and the equilibrium price is higher due to less fierce competi-
tion between the firms for the residents located at the peripheries of 
the town.
17 Figure 8 illustrates the consumer surplus as a function of 
x when both firms sell a product of higher quality. Figure 8 shows 
that the consumer surplus is maximum at  s x = . At the left of s, the 
consumer surplus increases with x, while at the right of s, the con-
sumer surplus decreases with s. More importantly, for the residents 
                                                      
17 More precisely, for a subset of residents (i.e. the residents located be-
tween s and 1/2), both the marginal utility from quality and the equilibrium 
price increase with x. In terms of consumer surplus, the impact of an higher 
marginal utility from quality amounts to γ , while the impact of the higher 
equilibrium price is t. Therefore, given the assumption on ϑ , the reduction 
of the utility due to higher price dominates the increase of utility due to 
higher marginal utility from quality. This implies that at the right of s, the 
consumer surplus function is piecewise linear (see later Figure 8).    47
located between  1
~ x  and  2 ˆ x , the surplus is higher than v, which is the 
surplus of all residents in case  ) , ( L L  and the maximum consumer 
surplus under the asymmetric configurations  ) , ( P L  and  ) , ( L P . 
The following proposition completes the analysis by comparing the 
consumer surplus in the case  ) , ( P P  with the consumer surplus in 
the case  ) , ( L L : 
 
Proposition 9. The consumer surplus is higher in case  ) , ( L L  than in 
case  ) , ( P P . 
 
Proof. See the Appendix.                                                                    ■                      
 
Figure 8 
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Proposition 9 shows that total consumer surplus is higher when both 
firms engages in logistic optimization with respect to the case where 
both firms engage in product innovation. This is due to the fact that, 
even if the richer residents located near to the city centre are better 
off when both firms product a high-quality good, the poorer residents 
located at the peripheries of the town would prefer a situation where 
both firms save on the transportation costs (logistic optimization). 
The latter effect dominates, thus determining that the total consumer 
surplus is higher in case  ) , ( L L  than in case  ) , ( P P .
18 Together, 
Proposition 8 and Proposition 9 show that the best business strategy 
configuration in terms of total consumer surplus (but not in terms of 
each resident) is the situation where both firms engage in logistic op-
timization. 
 
In the last part of this section, we consider welfare, which is defined 
as the sum of total consumer surplus and the profits of both firms. 
Using the equilibrium consumer surplus equations ((18), (19), (20) 
and (21)) and the equilibrium profits equations ((2), (3), (6), (7), (10) 
and (11)), we have the following welfare equation for each business 
strategy configuration: 
 
                                                      
18 No simple comparison can be performed between  ) , ( P P  and  ) , ( P L , and 
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The following proposition compares the welfare under the different 
configurations: 
 
Proposition 10. The welfare in case  ) , ( P L  is higher than the wel-
fare in case  ) , ( L P , which in turn is higher than the welfare in case 
) , ( L L ; the welfare in case  ) , ( P L  is higher (lower) than the welfare 
in case  ) , ( P P  when  1   ) ( ϑ ϑ ≥ ≤ . 
 
Proof. See the Appendix.                                                                    ■                      
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Proposition 10 shows that the business strategy configuration that 
maximizes welfare is represented by the symmetric configuration 
where both firms sell the high-quality good, provided that the pa-
rameter measuring the ratio between the efficiency of the product in-
novation and the efficiency of the logistic optimization process is 
sufficiently high. Instead, if the efficiency of the product innovation 
is particularly low with respect to the efficiency of the logistic opti-
mization process, the optimal business strategy configuration in 
terms of welfare is asymmetric, with the central firm that should pro-
duce the high-quality good, while the peripheral firm should save on 
the transportation costs. It is immediate to see that the equilibrium 
competitive equilibrium (Section 5) maximizes welfare, provided 
that  2  ϑ ϑ ≥ .
19 Also, the equilibrium emerging in the case of a multi-
plant monopolist (Section 6) always maximizes welfare. However, it 
should be noted that such welfare-maximizing result of the competi-
tive equilibrium and the monopolistic equilibrium is driven by fact 
that total profits are maximized. On the contrary, as shown by Propo-
sition 8 and 9, consumer surplus maximization would require a 
symmetric business strategy equilibrium where both firms engage in 
logistic optimization. 
 
                                                      
19 If  2  ϑ ϑ ≤ , also an asymmetric equilibrium where only the peripheral firm 
produces the high-quality good may arise: this business strategy configura-
tion is not welfare maximizing, as shown in Proposition 10.    51
8. Conclusions 
 
This paper investigates the strategic choice between product innova-
tion (developing a higher quality product) and logistic optimization 
(reducing the transportation costs) within a novel urban-type frame-
work, where residents are distributed along the city and have differ-
ent income depending on their location in the town. We analyse a 
two-stage model where the firms first decide which type of business 
strategy to adopt and then set the prices. We show that when the effi-
ciency of the product innovation process is low with respect to the 
efficiency of the logistic optimization process, multiple asymmetric 
business strategy equilibria arise. When the efficiency of the product 
innovation process is moderate, only an asymmetric business strat-
egy equilibrium arises, where the firm located at the periphery of the 
city chooses logistic optimization, while the firm located in the cen-
tral zone chooses product innovation. Instead, when the efficiency of 
the product innovation process is sufficiently high, both firms in 
equilibrium choose product innovation. Moreover, we show that the 
peripheral firm is more prompt than the central firm to choose logis-
tic optimization instead than product innovation. We investigate also 
the case of a multi-plant monopolist, and we show that when the ef-
ficiency of the product innovation process is sufficiently low with 
respect to the efficiency of the logistic optimization process, the cen-
tral plant engages in product innovation while the peripheral plant    52
engages in logistic optimization. Finally, we consider the welfare 
implications, and we show that total welfare is maximized when both 
firms engages in product innovation (if the efficiency of product in-
novation is high) or when the central firm engages in product innova-
tion and the peripheral firm engages in logistic optimization (if the 
efficiency of product innovation is low).  
Before concluding, it is worth to note that the functional form of the 
income distribution across the zones of the city plays a relevant role 
for the business strategy equilibrium that arises in the first stage of 
the game. In particular, the fact that high-income residents are lo-
cated at the centre of the city increases the incentive for the more 
central firm to engage in product innovation relatively to logistic op-
timization, as nearer residents are those consumers with the highest 
willingness to pay for high quality. Therefore, an interesting exten-
sion of the present bi-dimensional framework would consist in al-
lowing for more general forms of function  ) (x f . Even if an explicit 
solution of the model for other functional forms of  ) (x f  goes be-
hind the aim of this article, we can argue the following. Provided that 
the average income in the city is constant,
20 the flatter is function 
) (x f  (i.e., the more equal is the distribution of income across the 
city’s zones) the larger will be the parameter space supporting the 
                                                      
20 Clearly, if the average income of the town increases, we shall expect that 
both firms are more prompt to engage in product innovation, as the higher 
quality of the products would be evaluated more.    53
asymmetric business strategies equilibria where one firm engages in 
product innovation while the other engages in logistic optimization. 
This is due to the fact that the main incentive of each firm would 
consist in differentiating from the rival. Indeed, the price effect (see 
Section 5) would be weaker, as the quality difference between the 
products would evaluated less on average by residents. On the other 
hand, if function  ) (x f  is U-shape (i.e., high-income consumers re-
side at the peripheries of the town, while low-income consumers live 
in the city centre), we expect a situation opposite to the one illus-
trated in this article: in particular, for intermediate levels of the effi-
ciency of the product innovation process with respect to the effi-
ciency of the logistic optimization process, we should expect that the 
peripheral firm engages in product innovation, while the central firm 
engages in logistic optimization. 
Clearly, the model we proposed here is open to many improvements 
and extensions. For example, an interesting extension would be the 
following. Suppose a dynamic model that runs ad as follows. The 
firms in the first stage of the model choose the business strategy; in 
the second stage, they use the first’ period profits to cover the fixed 
costs needed to engage in the business strategy not adopted in the 
first period. In this case we should expect that the firms change the 
business strategy in the second period. The interesting question is 
which business strategy is chosen first: that is, firms are expected to 
produce “elite” goods at high prices and then try to improve the sell    54
services (by reducing the transportation costs) in order to capture 
low-income residents or, on the other hand, the firms are expected to 
start from low prices and then engage to improve the quality of their 
product to enter in high-income residents segment? The answer to 




Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that x is near to firm A, that is, 
s x < . Without loss of generality, we assume that if the utility of a 
consumer is the same when he buys from firm A and when he buys 
from firm B, the consumer buys from the nearer firm.
21 This assump-
tion is standard in spatial models, and allows avoiding the technical-
ity of ε-equilibria without affecting the results. Consider firm B. 
First, we show that   x d s t p
x
B − + >  cannot be an equilibrium. 
When  x d s t p
x




A p p = : the resident x buys from firm A, which obtains a positive 
mark-up, as  x d s t x d s t − − > − +  since  s x < . Firm B has the 






' , where ε  is a positive and small number. Since 
x
B p  is 
                                                      
21 For more details about this assumption, see for example Hamilton et al. 
(1989).     55
higher than  x d s t − +  by hypothesis and ε  is a positive and small 
number by definition, 
' x
B p  is higher than the transportation costs sus-
tained by firm B (i.e. the mark-up of firm B on consumer x is posi-
tive). Therefore,  x d s t p
x
B − + >  cannot be an equilibrium, because 
firm B would obtain higher profits by setting 
' x
B p . We now show that 
x d s t p
x




A p p = . With such a price firm B obtains zero profits from resident 
x, which buys from firm A, but it has no incentive to change the 
price, because by increasing the price it would continue to obtain 
zero profits, and setting a price lower than zero would entail a loss 
(the mark-up would be negative). It follows that 




A − + = =  represents the (unique) price equilibrium. 
The proof for  s x >  is symmetric. Finally, when the resident is 
equally distant from the two firms ( s x = ), the standard Bertrand’s 
result  holds:  both  firms  set  a  price  equal  to  the  marginal  cost.                     
■                                                                                                        
 
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall that in the case  ) , ( P L  the utility of a 
resident buying from firm A is 
x
A p v− , while the utility of a resident 
buying from firm B is 
x
B p x f v − + ) ( γ . Suppose that x is such that 
) (x f x d s t γ ≥ − + . Without loss of generality, we assume that in    56
case of equal utility the resident buys from the firm with lower trans-
portation costs, i.e. firm A. This assumption – as the successive for 
the case  ) (x f x d s t γ ≤ − +  – allows avoiding ε-equilibria, but it is 




A p x f v p v − + = − ) ( γ , we get that firm A serves resident x if 




A γ − ≤ . First, we show that   x d s t p
x
B − + >  cannot be 
an equilibrium. When  x d s t p
x
B − + > , the best-reply of firm A 




A γ − = : the resident x buys from firm A, 
which obtains a non-negative mark-up, as  0 ) ( ≥ − − + x f x d s t γ  by 
assumption. Firm B has the incentive to undercut firm A by setting a 





' , where ε  is a positive and small num-
ber. Since 
x
B p  is higher than  x d s t − +  by hypothesis and ε  is a 
positive and small number by definition, 
' x
B p  is higher than the 
transportation costs sustained by firm B (i.e. the mark-up of firm B 
on resident x is positive). Therefore,  x d s t p
x
B − + >  cannot be an 
equilibrium, because firm B would obtain higher profits by setting 
' x
B p . We show that  x d s t p
x
B − + =  is an equilibrium. The best-




A γ − = . With such a price firm B 
obtains zero profits from resident x, which buys from firm A, but it 
has no incentive to change the price, because increasing the price it    57
would continue to obtain zero profits, and setting a price lower than 
zero would entail a loss (the mark-up would be negative). It follows 
that  ) (x f x d s t p
x
A γ − − + =  and  x d s t p
x
B − + =  represents the 
(unique) price equilibrium. Suppose now that x is such that 
) (x f x d s t γ ≤ − + . Without loss of generality, we assume that in 
case of equal utility the resident buys from the firm with the higher 
quality, i.e. firm B. Again, this allows avoiding ε-equilibria, but it is 
without any other consequence. First, we show that   ) (x f p
x
B γ >  
cannot be an equilibrium. When  ) (x f p
x
B γ > , the best-reply of firm 




A , with  ω  being a positive 
and small number: the resident x buys from firm A, which obtains a 
positive mark-up as  0 ) ( > > x f p
x
B γ  by assumption. Firm B has the 






' , where ε  is a positive and small number. Since 
x d s t x f p
x
B − + ≥ > ) ( γ  and ε  is a positive and small number by 
definition, 
' x
B p  is higher than the transportation costs sustained by 
firm B (i.e. the mark-up of firm B on residents x is positive). There-
fore,  ) (x f p
x
B γ >  cannot be an equilibrium, because firm B would 
obtain higher profits  by setting 
' x
B p . We show instead that 
) (x f p
x
B γ =  is an equilibrium. The best-reply of firm A  is: 




A γ . With such a price firm A obtains zero profits    58
from resident x but it has no incentive to change the price, because 
increasing the price it would continue to obtain zero profits, and set-
ting a price lower than zero would entail a loss (the mark-up would 
be negative). It follows that  ) (x f p
x
B γ =  and  0 =
x
A p  represents the 
(unique) price equilibrium.                                                                 ■            
 
Proof of Proposition 3. By solving  ) (x f x d s t γ = − + , we derive 
the “limit” residents, i.e. those residents that determine the urban 
area served by each firm. Four cases are possible:  








) ( ˆ1 ; 









) ( ˆ1 ;  







) ( ˆ2 ;  








γ ) ( ˆ2 .  
We want to prove that when  ] 1   ), ( 2 1 [ d s− − ∈ ϑ , cases 2) and 3) are 
not possible. This guarantees that the market area of the product-
innovating firm is continuous. Consider case 2). For it to be possible, 
it must be that 
2
1 ˆ1 ≥ y , or  ϑ ≥ − + 1 ) ( 2 d s , which is impossible 
when  ϑ ≤ − − ) ( 2 1 d s , since  1 ) ( 2 ) ( 2 1 − + ≥ − − d s d s . Consider    59
case 3). For it to be possible, it must be that 
2
1 ˆ2 ≤ y , or 
ϑ ≥ + − ) ( 2 1 d s ,  which is impossible when  ϑ ≤ − − ) ( 2 1 d s , since 
) ( 2 1 ) ( 2 1 d s d s + − ≥ − − . Note that if case 2) and case 3) were 




The assumption on ϑ  allows avoiding such piecewise configuration 
of the market areas, while determining a more tractable configuration 
where the market area of firm B is continuous.                                  ■                      
 
Proof of Proposition 5. By solving  ) (x f x d s t γ = − − , we derive 
the “limit” residents. Four cases are possible:  









1 ;  










1 ;  
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We want to prove that when  ] 1   ), ( 2 1 [ d s− − ∈ ϑ , cases 2) and 3) are 
not possible. Consider case 2). For it to be possible, it must be that 
2
1 ~
1 ≥ y , or  ϑ ≥ − − 1 ) ( 2 d s , which is impossible when 




Consider case 3). For it to be possible, it must be that 
2
1 ~
2 ≤ y , or 
ϑ ≥ − − ) ( 2 1 d s ,  which is impossible. Therefore, the market area of 
the product-innovating firm is continuous.                                         ■                     
 
Proof of Proposition 6. First, we show that if firm A chooses L, then 
firm  B  chooses  P. This amounts to require that 
0
) ( 4










2 ) 2 2 1 ( s d − − ≥ ϑ , which is always 
satisfied. Similarly, we show that if firm B chooses L, then firm A 
chooses P. This amounts to require that  0
) ( 4











2 ) 2 2 1 ( s d − + ≥ ϑ , which is always satisfied. Suppose now that 
one firm chooses P. We look for the conditions under which choos-
ing the same business strategy, P, is the best-reply for the rival. 
When such conditions are not satisfied, the best-reply is L. Suppose 





A Π − Π ≡ Γ . Solving  0 1 ≥ Γ  with respect to ϑ , we get that 
0 1 ≥ Γ  when  1 ϑ ϑ ≥  and  0 1 ≤ Γ  otherwise, where the root is the fol-
lowing: 
) 2 ( 2
2 2 4 2 1
2 2
1 d s d
s s d d
−
+ − + −
= ϑ . 
Suppose now that firm A chooses P. Let us define the following 




B Π − Π ≡ Γ . Solving  0 2 ≥ Γ  with respect to ϑ , we 
get that  0 2 ≥ Γ  when  2 ϑ ϑ ≥  and  0 2 ≤ Γ  otherwise, where the root 
is the following: 
) 2 2 ( 2
2 2 4 2 1
2 2
2 s d d
s s d d
− −
+ − + −
= ϑ . 
Now we compare the critical values  1 ϑ  and  2 ϑ . We want to show 
that  2 1 ϑ ϑ ≥ . As the numerators of the two critical values coincide, it 
is sufficient to require that the denominator of  1 ϑ  is lower than the 
denominator of  2 ϑ . This amounts to require that 
s d d s 2 2 2 − − ≤ − , or  2 1 ≤ s , which is always true by assump-
tion.                                                                                                     ■     
            
Proof of Proposition 7. First, we show that  ) , ( L P  is always domi-
nated by  ) , ( P L . Consider the difference between 
LP Π  and 
PL Π : 
0








s dt PL LP . Next, we show that  ) , ( L L  is al-
ways dominated by  ) , ( P L . Consider the difference between 
LP Π     62
and 
LL Π : 
) ( 4






= Π − Π
t
s d t LL LP . We want to show 
that the numerator is always positive, that is: 
2 )] ( 2 1 [ d s+ − ≥ ϑ . As 
) ( 2 1 d s− − ≥ ϑ , in order to prove that  0 ≥ Π − Π
LL LP , it is suffi-
cient to show that: 
2 )] ( 2 1 [ ) ( 2 1 d s d s + − ≥ − − . Note that the left-
hand-side of the last inequality increases with d, while the right-
hand-side decreases with d. Therefore, if the inequality holds for the 
lowest admissible value of d, it must hold also for the other values. 
Substituting  0 = d , we get:  0 2 1 ≥ − s , which is always verified. Fi-
nally, let us define the following function: 
LP PP Π − Π ≡ Γ3 . Solving 
0 3 ≥ Γ  with respect to ϑ , we get that  0 3 ≥ Γ  when  1 ϑ ϑ ≥  and 
0 3 ≤ Γ  otherwise.                                                                               ■                     
                                                                             
Proof of Proposition 9. We want to prove that 
PP LL CS CS ≥ , or 
v
s s d t v
≥
+ − + − +
4
) 2 2 2 1 ( 2 4
2 γ
, which amounts to: 
) 2 2 2 1 ( 2
2 s s d + − + ≥ ϑ . As  ) ( 2 1 d s− − ≥ ϑ , a sufficient condi-
tion for 
PP LL CS CS ≥  is that  ) 2 2 2 1 ( 2 ) ( 2 1
2 s s d d s + − + ≥ − − . 
After simplifications, this condition reduces to: 
0 6 6 6 3
2 ≥ + − + s s d  which is always verified.                               ■                      
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Proof of Proposition 10. First, we show that the welfare in case 
) , ( P L  is always higher than in case  ) , ( L P . This amounts to require 
that 
PL LP W W ≥ , which, after simplifications, reduces to: 
2 2 ) 2 2 1 ( ) 2 2 1 ( s d s d − + ≤ − − , which is always verified. Next, we 
show that the welfare in case  ) , ( L P  is always higher than in case 
) , ( L L . This amounts to require that 
LL PL W W ≥ , which, after sim-
plifications, reduces to:  0
) ( 4









. For the last ine-
quality to be verified, it is sufficient that 
2 )] ( 2 1 [ d s− − ≥ ϑ . As 
) ( 2 1 d s− − ≥ ϑ , it is sufficient to prove that 
2 )] ( 2 1 [ ) ( 2 1 d s d s − − ≥ − − , which is always true. It remains to 
compare 
LP W  with 
PP W . By solving  0 = −
PP LP W W , we obtain 
the root  1 ϑ . In particular, when  1  ϑ ϑ ≤ , we have  0 ≥ −
PP LP W W , 
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